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No other choice but co-operation
The background of Lithuania’s and Latvia’s relations with Belarus 
Kamil Kłysiński
For years now Belarus has been a key economic partner for Lithuania and Latvia. These two 
Baltic states have well-developed port infrastructure and thus provide what are the geo-
graphically closest and also the cheapest exit to international outlets for Belarusia’s petro-
chemical and chemical industries, both of which are export-oriented. As a result, the transit 
of Belarusian goods is one of the major sources of income for the state budgets of the two co-
untries. This economic interdependence has affected the stance Riga and Vilnius take on Minsk 
at the EU forum. When in February and March 2012 the Council of the European Union was re-
solving the issue of imposing economic sanction on selected Belarusian companies which bac-
ked Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, this triggered a discussion on what the point of such me-
asures is and on possible economic losses in Lithuania and Latvia. As a result of firm resistance 
from Latvia (which was backed by Slovenia), the Council removed those companies which 
were most strongly engaged in co-operation with Latvian partners from the list of those to be 
covered with economic sanctions. Lithuania, which is more critical of the political situation in 
Belarus, did not express its official opposition to the sanctions. Despite some differences in the 
policies adopted by Riga and Vilnius, it turned out that Minsk could count on strong support 
from local business groups in both of these countries, as these groups fear impediments in this 
highly profitable co-operation and also retaliation from the Belarusian government. 
The existing economic bonds mean that neither Vilnius nor Riga have any other choice but 
to co-operate with Belarus. They must therefore adopt a carefully balanced policy towards 
Minsk. At the same time, being EU member states, they do not officially deny that a problem 
exists with the violation of human rights by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. It is for this re-
ason that the governments of Latvia and Lithuania will be interested in maintaining the status 
quo in relations with Minsk. On the other hand, Belarus in a way also has no other choice but 
to use the ports in Lithuania and Latvia, and this will prevent it from excessively escalating 
tension in relations with these two countries. 
The Lithuanian double-track policy
Lithuania has adopted a double-track poli-
cy with regard to Belarus; it maintains and 
develops economic co-operation and at the 
same time criticises the policy of Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka’s regime and actively supports the 
Belarusian opposition and social activists and 
independent media in Belarus. This stance is 
partly an effect of Lithuania being in the imme-
diate neighbourhood with Belarus, whose indu-
stry to a major extent helps keep the business 
of the Lithuanian railways and the Klaipeda sea 
port running smoothly. According to available 
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data, approximately one third of the cargo han-
dled at this port are products originating from 
Belarus (at present, these are primarily po-
tassium fertilisers). Furthermore, Belarusian 
shipments account for as much as 40% in the 
structure of goods transported by Lithuanian 
railways1. This co-operation is much more im-
portant for Lithuania than trade with Belarus2, 
since it allows the transport and logistics indu-
stry, whose share in GDP reaches almost 10%3, 
to flourish. Belarus is also a transit country for 
goods dispatched from Ukrainian ports, inclu-
ding by special ‘Viking’ freight trains. 
Given this situation, the Lithuanian government 
has been making efforts not to escalate tension 
in relations with Belarus to ensure that this does 
not affect adversely the profitable economic 
co-operation in the field of transit. At the same 
time, when the Belarusian regime resumed 
brutal repressions against the opposition in 
December 2010 (after the presidential election 
in Belarus), the active policy of the Lithuanian 
president, Dalia Grybauskaite, had to be di-
scontinued. Grybauskaite had initiated political 
dialogue with the regime from 2009 to bring 
Minsk closer to the EU and create a favourable 
climate for economic contacts. Currently, po-
litical relations between Lithuania and Belarus 
are much more limited, and Lithuania is issuing 
critical statements on violations of human ri-
ghts and the principles of democracy in Belarus. 
Thus Lithuania also supports the critical stance 
1  For more details, see the interview with the ambas-
sador of the Republic of Belarus in Lithuania, Uladzi-
mir Drazhyn, http://www.baltic-course.com/rus/opin-
ion/?doc=59690 
2 Belarus, as with the entire CIS area, is of minor signifi-
cance for Lithuanian exports: in 2011 only approx. 13% 
of Lithuania’s exports went to post-Soviet countries, 
most of which were directed to Russia. In turn, Lithu-
ania had a share of approx. 2% in Belarusian exports 
in 2011, which ensured it eighth position on the list of 
trade partners. The total trade volume between the two 
countries reached almost US$1.2 billion, where exports 
from Belarus prevailed significantly. 
3 According to calculations from the Lithuanian Confe-
deration of Industrialists. 
taken regarding Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s poli-
cy and – like other EU member states – insists 
that all political prisoners should be released. 
Furthermore, Vilnius (along with Warsaw) has 
become a key location for the operation of nu-
merous Belarusian NGOs (these had been for-
ced to leave Belarus) and also for the operation 
of agencies of Western foundations which sup-
port Belarusian civil society which are for this 
reason unable to take direct action in Belarus. It 
appears that the main goal for Vilnius now is to 
preserve the status quo in relations with Bela-
rus, i.e. to maintain the present level of econo-
mic co-operation on the one hand, and to keep 
in force the presently applicable sanctions on 
the other. The Lithuanian government is of the 
opinion that if it were to take action to soften 
the stance the EU is taking towards Minsk, Vil-
nius would risk incurring high political costs at 
the EU forum. On the other hand, lobbying for 
imposing stricter sanctions on the regime co-
uld bring major economic losses. It also seems 
that Lithuania would be critical of any possible 
proposals for the expansion of the economic 
sanctions. 
The economic priority in Latvia’s policy
Latvia depends even more heavily than Lithu-
ania on the transport of Belarusian goods or 
those transported via Belarus. The transport 
and logistics sector accounts for approxima-
Lithuania has adopted a double-track 
policy with regard to Belarus; it maintains 
and develops economic co-operation 
and at the same time criticises the policy 
of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime 
and actively supports the Belarusian 
opposition.
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tely 13%4 of Latvia’s GDP (slightly more than in 
Lithuania), and goods coming from or through 
Belarus5 account for over 50% of the total fre-
ight value. Thus Latvia, which has been severe-
ly affected by the economic crisis and has no 
well-developed industry, de facto may not al-
low a situation where economic relations with 
Belarus would be seriously restricted. Further-
more, trade with Belarus plays a greater role 
in Latvian-Belarusian relations than is the case 
with Lithuania6. At the same time, Latvia, unlike 
Lithuania, has never been engaged in such an 
active policy aimed at making Belarus involved 
in co-operation with the EU and adopting de-
mocratic standards. Furthermore, unlike Vil-
nius, Riga is not a place where the Belarusian 
third sector and political opposition opera-
te. As a consequence, Latvia’s policy towards 
Belarus is dominated by the economic factor 
and this would dictate great caution be taken 
when making decisions concerning visa sanc-
tions or, even more so, economic sanctions. On 
the other hand, the Latvian government notices 
4 Report on development of the economy of Latvia,
 http://www.em.gov.lv/em/2nd/?cat=30353, p. 26.
5 This concerns the transit of both goods manufactured in 
Belarus (approximately 35% of total freight) and those 
transported from other countries, including primarily 
Russia and Ukraine.
6 Latvia has been among the most important trade part-
ners of Belarus for years. According to data for 2011, 
it was ranked fourth, with a 7.6% share in Belarusian 
exports. Exports from Belarus form the greatest part 
of the trade volume (approximately US$3 billion), sim-
ilar to what is the case with trade with Lithuania. It can 
be assumed that part of the goods are subsequently 
re-exported. 
the problem of the violation of human rights 
and democratic standards in Belarus, and does 
not take a separate stance than that taken by 
the EU as a whole, which sees a possible su-
spension of sanctions and dialogue with the 
regime as being dependent on the release of 
political prisoners. 
Belarus and its lobbyists in Latvia and 
Lithuania 
Minsk is aware of the significance of the transit 
of goods from Belarus for Latvia and Lithuania, 
and has been trying to capitalise on this in re-
lations with these two Baltic countries. Such 
actions have been taken in two areas. Firstly, 
Minsk has used the natural competition be-
tween Lithuania and Latvia for their share in the 
transport of goods from Belarus, thus causing 
a reduction in freight tariffs, to its own benefit. 
Secondly, it has been attempting to convince 
the governments of Latvia and Lithuania to take 
action at the EU forum to protect Belarusian in-
terests. This type of activity was especially evi-
dent in spring 2012, when EU member states 
were considering imposing economic sanctions 
on selected Belarusian companies which form 
the financial base of the Belarusian regime. 
Minsk (according to unofficial information) 
was putting pressure behind the scenes on bu-
sinessmen from the EU, including from Latvia 
and Lithuania, who had invested their capital 
in Belarus and were in a way dependent on the 
good will of the Belarusian government7. This 
pressure resulted in intensified lobbying acti-
vity from business circles from some EU mem-
ber states. The lobbyists were attempting to 
7 According to this information, the most significant in-
vestors from EU member states were invited to the 
Belarusian Presidential Administration in March 2012. 
They were required to start lobbying for a less strict de-
cision concerning sanctions. Otherwise they could ex-
pect ‘complications’ in running their business in Belarus. 
Latvia, which has been severely af-
fected by the economic crisis and has 
no well-developed industry, de facto may 
not allow a situation where economic 
relations with Belarus would be seriously 
restricted.
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convince decision makers both in Brussels and 
in the capital cities of some EU member states 
to refrain from imposing stricter sanctions on 
Minsk. The lobbying was the most intensive and 
the best-organised in Lithuania and Latvia. This 
was because economic co-operation with Be-
larus is very important for local business elites. 
In Lithuania, the Confederation of Industrialists8 
at that time was (and still is) the key centre of 
lobbying for a lenient policy towards Belarus. 
Its members include one of the few large Lithu-
anian investors in Belarus, Sigitas Paulauskas9, 
and businesses controlled by Achema corpora-
tion, which is owned by the family and associa-
tes of the Lithuanian oligarch Bronislovas Lubys, 
who died a year ago. The business circles which 
form this organisation have been making the-
ir best endeavours to influence Vilnius’s policy 
on Minsk or at least to cause the Lithuanian go-
vernment to block a further expansion of sanc-
tions. The lobbying was conducted with the use 
of media controlled by Achema, i.e. the Lietuvos 
Zinios daily newspaper and Baltijos TV station, 
and also by ordering and paying for publications 
in the popular newspaper Respublika. Further-
more, the Confederation of Industrialists was 
attempting to attract the attention of the media 
by publishing sensational assessments of losses 
which could be incurred if economic co-opera-
tion with Belarus were discontinued. According 
to their estimates, the losses would reach ap-
proximately 6 billion litas (over US$ 2 billion), i.e. 
around 6% of the country’s GDP. However, these 
figures were inflated with the intention of spar-
king public debate in Lithuania and thus putting 
pressure on the government. 
8 Lietuvos Pramonininku Konfederacija, www.lpk.lt 
9 He owns a large hardboard factory in Mogilev Oblast, 
which was built with support from the Swedish corpora-
tion IKEA. IKEA is the key recipient of the factory’s out-
put. This is one of the largest Lithuanian investments 
in the Republic of Belarus. Other significant projects 
include a construction supermarket built near Minsk by 
Augustinas Rakauskas (in co-operation with Finland’s 
Kesko group) and the logistics centre in Rakaw, Minsk 
Oblast, built by a firm owned by the Lithuanian entre-
preneur Nikolaj Kolesnik. 
The impact of Latvian lobbyists on maintaining 
correct relations with Belarus for the sake of 
economic co-operation with Belarus is cur-
rently significantly stronger than in Lithuania. 
The main centres of lobbying and support for 
Minsk are two major economic associations: 
the Society for the Promotion of Economic Re-
lations between Latvia and Belarus10 chaired by 
Alfreds Cepanis and the Latvian-Belarusian 
Business Co-operation Council, which is co-
chaired by Dmitry Ditchkovsky (the owner of 
Milavitsa) as a representative of Belarus, and 
by Aivars Locmelis (Felix Holding) represen-
ting Latvia. Another influential businessman, 
who preceded Locmelis as the chairman of the 
business council, namely Vasilijs Melniks (Eiro-
holdings), must be mentioned in this context. 
Everything seems to indicate that he is at pre-
sent the key lobbyist for a pragmatic approach 
to Belarus. Vasilijs Melniks holds shares in the 
Freeport of Riga, which along with Ventspils, 
is a key port for loading and dispatching Bela-
rusian petroleum products. He also is the head 
of numerous economic associations in Latvia 
and has a well-developed network of contacts 
and acquaintances in the Latvian elite. Owing 
to this, he has developed a very strong position 
in Latvia over the past decade or so. The Latvian 
Confederation of Employers has also made stre-
nuous efforts to prevent the imposition of stric-
ter sanctions on Belarus. Its chairperson, Liga 
Mengelsone, has argued that sanctions impo-
sed on Latvia’s Belarusian economic partners 
could result in a loss of approximately 480 mil-
10 Latvijas – Baltkrievijas ekonomisko sakaru veicināšanas 
biedrība, www.latbel.lv
Groups of lobbyists, who are making 
attempts to prevent the imposition of 
stricter EU sanctions on Belarus, are 
active in both Lithuania and Latvia.
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lion euros11. An even more pessimistic scenario 
was presented by the chairman of the Society 
for the Promotion of Economic Relations be-
tween Latvia and Belarus. He calculated that 
the maximum cost of the restrictions in econo-
mic co-operation with Belarus could reach as 
much as 1 billion euros. As in Lithuania, it is 
suspected that these figures were inflated and 
aimed primarily at provoking a discussion in the 
media, mobilising public opinion, and thus put-
ting pressure on the Latvian government. 
One aspect which is different to the situation in 
Lithuania is the presence of Belarusian capital 
in Latvia as an important instrument in the lo-
bbying for Belarusian interests12. In Daugavpils, 
the capital city of the frontier region Latga-
le, two very successful production companies 
are in operation, Mamas D. (biofuel produc-
tion) and Alus D. (brewery), in which the ma-
jority stake is controlled by Yuri Chizh, who is 
a well-known Belarusian entrepreneur13. Owing 
11 http://news.tut.by/economics/279168.html
12 In the case of Lithuania only two examples where 
there is a major presence of Belarusian capital can be 
mentioned: the glass factory in Klaipeda and the fac-
tory in western Lithuania, which manufactures ‘pellet’, 
a type of heating fuel. In addition to these, a num-
ber of Lithuanian-Belarusian joint ventures operate in 
Lithuania. They mostly deal with the distribution of 
products of Belarusian industry, for example, Transche-
ma (petroleum products). 
13 One of the four Belarusian businessmen who have been 
banned from entering the EU on suspicion of financially 
backing Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. The Latvian 
media informed in December 2012 that Chizh had trans-
ferred or sold (no precise information regarding which 
has been available) his shares in Mamas D. The new 
owners are two Belarusian citizens who are working for 
one of the companies which belong to Triple corpora-
tion, which is controlled by Chizh. Thus this is most likely 
merely an attempt to avoid EU sanctions. 
to his investments, Chizh has great influence 
in the region and is respected by local elites as 
one of the key employers. In addition to Chizh, 
who is well-known, another Belarusian com-
pany, Oil Logistic, which is directed by Andrey 
Markushev, is active in Latvia. This firm has 
for many years handled the transportation of 
Belarusian goods to Latvian ports and transit 
from Belarus via Latvia to Estonia under con-
tracts signed with Latvian railways. The foun-
ders and shareholders of this company are lar-
ge state-controlled Belarusian petrochemical 
corporations: Belneftekhim, Belkali, NAFTAN 
factory and the exploration and production 
company Belarusneft. 
While assessing the potential of Belarusian lo-
bbying in these countries, it is important to 
pay attention to the role played by Belarusian 
embassies. In both Lithuania and Latvia they 
are headed by experienced ambassadors14 
who have held their posts for six years already. 
Owing to this, each of them has a well-develo-
ped network of contacts with local business and 
political elites. This offers them great opportu-
nities for lobbying for solutions favourable to 
Belarus. Furthermore, both of these diplomats 
have held top positions in the Belarusian state 
apparatus, which essentially strengthens their 
position as representatives of the Belarusian 
government. 
Blackmail from Minsk
In addition to behind-the-scenes lobbying, the 
Belarusian government has regularly threate-
ned the governments of Latvia and Lithuania 
publicly that, should EU sanctions become stric-
ter, it will redirect the transit of Belarusian go-
ods to Russia. On 9 November 2012, President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced that he and 
14 Uladzimir Drazhyn, a former deputy prime minister of 
the Republic of Belarus, is the ambassador to Lithuania. 
In turn, the Belarusian embassy in Latvia is directed by 
Alyaksandr Gerasimenko, former deputy minister of for-
eign affairs of the Republic of Belarus. 
In addition to behind-the-scenes lobbying, 
the Belarusian government has regularly 
threatened the governments of Latvia and 
Lithuania publicly that, should EU sanc-
tions become stricter, it will redirect the 
transit of Belarusian goods to Russia.
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the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, had de-
cided to redirect a significant part of cargoes 
from ports in the Baltic states to Russian ports 
in Leningrad Oblast, i.e. primarily to the port 
in Ust-Luga, which is now being enlarged, and 
the Saint Petersburg port. This signifies that the 
Belarusian government is attempting to force 
Latvia and Lithuania to offer even more favo-
urable transport conditions, and probably also 
to convince them to take action to alleviate the 
sanctions. Furthermore, it also seems that the 
stakes in this game could be consent for the 
Belarusian side to lease or build its own re-
loading terminals in Klaipeda (Lithuania) and/or 
Ventspils (Latvia); Minsk has been seeking for 
this for a long time, seeing this as an opportu-
nity to significantly reduce costs. 
However, according to available expert calcula-
tions, a total or near total redirection of trans-
port to Russian ports would be unrewarding15. 
Firstly, Latvia’s Ventspils and Lithuania’s Klaipe-
da are located much closer to the Belarusian 
manufacturers, which has a great impact on the 
transport costs. From this point of view, it co-
uld be reasonable to no longer use the services 
offered by the Estonian Muuga port16. Howe-
ver, this port has a marginal share in handling 
Belarusian exports. Furthermore, another serio-
us impediment is the lack of adequate loading 
capacity at the Saint Petersburg port (which is 
seriously overloaded) and at the Ust-Luga port 
(which is now being developed). Therefore, the 
volume of transit of Belarusian goods via Lithu-
ania and Latvia is unlikely to fall significantly 
in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the risk 
of a gradual decrease in profits from co-ope-
ration with Belarus is real; and for this reason, 
15 For more detail see: http://naviny.by/rubrics/econom-
ic/2012/11/21/ic_articles_113_179964/ 
16 For comparison: the distance (along the railroad tracks) 
from the potassium factory in Soligorsk to Klaipeda 
is 712 km, while to Saint Petersburg it is 998 km. In 
turn, the length of the railway track from the refinery 
in Navapolatsk to Estonia’s Muuga is 851 km, while the 
distance to Ust-Luga is only 803 km.
the governments of these two Baltic states will 
make efforts to offer additional incentives for 
their Belarusian partners to continue co-opera-
tion. The offer made to the Belarusian ambas-
sador in Latvia by the minister of transport and 
communications, Aivis Ronis, to lease or build 
Belarusian reloading terminals in Ventspils in 
November 2012 may be seen as the emergen-
ce of this trend. At the same time, it will be in 
Minsk’s interest to leave the choice between the 
Russian ports and the ports in the Baltic states 
as an open question, so that it may derive the 
maximum benefit possible from this situation 
The possibilities of further co-operation
Latvia and Lithuania are in a way permanently 
condemned to economic co-operation with 
Belarus. Thus, regardless of the political option 
prevailing at a given time, each government in 
Riga and Vilnius when considering policy will 
be forced to take into account the maintenance 
of good economic relations with Minsk. 
This does not, however, mean that these coun-
tries will make any concessions and thus de fac-
to advocate Belarus’s interests at the EU forum. 
As previous experience has shown, the only re-
sult Lithuanian and Latvian lobbyists can achie-
ve is to cause Riga and possibly Vilnius to block 
support for the imposition of further sanctions 
on Belarus. What they are unable to do is to 
cause a change in direction in the foreign poli-
cies of their countries that would be more be-
neficial for the Belarusian regime. For this re-
The only result Lithuanian and Latvian 
lobbyists can achieve is to cause Riga 
and possibly Vilnius to block support 
for the imposition of further sanctions 
on Belarus.
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ason, the governments of Latvia and Lithuania 
will do their best to continue the present policy 
so as not to put themselves in conflict within 
the EU and at the same time not to create ad-
ditional tension in relations with Belarus. 
However, the stances taken by Vilnius and 
Riga on the situation in Belarus will differ. 
Lithuania, being a country engaged in suppor-
ting the Belarusian third sector, will be more 
critical of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. 
Latvia, in turn, will always adopt a more flexi-
ble stance since it is more focused on economic 
issues. 
Meanwhile, for Belarus, the transit of goods 
via Lithuania and Latvia is such a profitable va-
riant that the Belarusian government will make 
efforts to maintain good relations with these 
countries. Minsk, which is strongly interested 
in co-operation with its Baltic neighbours, will 
be avoiding confrontation, even should Vilnius 
or Riga support a decision at the EU forum that 
will be unfavourable for Belarus. 
